

How Congress con Americans out of the unalienable Right of Liberty, into “voluntary” servitude.

By Thomas Clark Nelson.

A treatise, reacquainting the American People with the notion of *Liberty* (freedom from external restraint or compulsion); revealing and documenting fraud on an unprecedented and almost incomprehensible scale on the part of Congress and why—*strictly legally speaking*—no American, simply by virtue of birth in the United States of America (the Union), is the subject of the legislative acts of Congress, such as the Patriot Act, Homeland Security Act, National Defense Authorization Act, Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), and even the Internal Revenue Code; and introducing the remedies authorized by law for any Union-state-born American to recover his birthright, realized the day of his birth: the God-given *unalienable Right of Liberty*, as guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence and ordained in the Constitution, free of subjection to the personal legislative jurisdiction of Congress.

November 12, 2013.

Disclaimer.

The contents hereof are not intended as legal advice, should not be inferred to be such, and are offered strictly in the spirit of education, scholarship, research, and helping one's fellow Man through the sharing of his experiences.

There is no recommendation that the reader apply any of said material to his life and no guarantee of results in the event that he does; but by the same token, there is no known falsehood within these pages.

Further, the writer hereof has never suggested that someone do what he has not done himself or would not do.

The reader should undertake a particular course of action not because it is written here, but only because of his own due diligence, verification and evaluation of pertinent facts, and realization of personal certainty in the matter under consideration.

The authors whose work is quoted herein are thanked for their diligence and scholarship. This *How Congress con Americans out of the unalienable Right of Liberty, into "voluntary" servitude* is offered free of charge and is intended for the reader's erudition as set forth above, to be adopted or rejected as the reader sees fit.

Preface.

Shortly after the CEO of the District of Columbia municipal corporation on December 31, 2011, approved the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012* (NDAA), setting the stage for indefinite military detention of Americans, this author broke from the project on which he was working and set about to provide Union-state-born Americans with a remedy, of manageable length and authorized by law, to dissolve the assertion and prevent the exercise of power of personal jurisdiction via NDAA by agents of said municipal corporation.

Whereas, no United States Attorney or Federal judge had ever failed to dismiss or close, summarily, any of the cases in which this author had assisted, upon the filing into the record of the case of a single document, prepared by this author and signed, sworn to, and executed by the defendant, for lack of jurisdiction, each of those filings was in response to a legal attack; the remedy for NDAA rather required a proactive instrument, able to obviate assertions of power of personal jurisdiction *prior* to any attempted enforcement thereof.

Because time was of the essence and of the gravity of the situation, that writing had to be succinct yet comprehensive.

When Chris Hedges on May 16, 2012, secured a temporary injunction on the indefinite-detention portion of the Act (§ 1021(b)(2)) this author took time to rework the initial discourse, *Purging America of the Matrix* (first released early February 2012, revised several times, and republished October 22, 2012), and commence a second, more basic approach to the subject for the man on the street, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse* (published January 3, 2013).

Thereafter came the monograph “Sample handling of a demand from a tax collector” (March 4, 2013), and discourse *How to use a car without the need for a driver’s license* (June 7, 2013).

The personal-jurisdiction entrapment scheme of the Government of the United States, a/k/a Government of the District of Columbia, is multifaceted and must be addressed systematically so as to avoid slipping back into the trap again inadvertently.

The within discourse, published subsequent to all the above works, provides a bird’s eye view of Congress in action, hard at work in behalf of their creditor-masters at the private Federal Reserve, at the expense and to the detriment of the American People.

Notwithstanding Mr. Hedges’ best efforts, NDAA § 1021(b)(2) is back in force as of July 17, 2013. Meanwhile, this author is unaware of any other practical remedy that dissolves assertions of power of personal jurisdiction by commercial alphabet-soup agencies under the direction of the CEO (BHO) of the instant de facto national government, the District of Columbia municipal corporation (inc. February 21, 1871), than those offered in this webpage.

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Evidently, the ultimate legal principle upon which Congress and the rest of the Government of the United States rely to impose their will on the American People and, as afforded thereby, the remainder of the population of Earth is this:

Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of the fact excuses ; ignorance of the law excuses not.¹

That the particular “law” of which the American People are ignorant, however—which is hidden in plain sight and protected by the phenomenon known as *cognitive dissonance*²—is fraudulent by nature and ultimately invalid, is concealed (knowingly or unknowingly) from its victims by all who make (legislature), declare (judiciary), or apply (law enforcement) said “law.”

Today, any American suspected by law enforcement of violating the “law” who fails to demonstrate, on an immediate basis, that he is not the subject of said “law,” is in danger of loss of life through summary application of deadly force.

Sensus verborum est anima legis. The meaning of words is the spirit of the law.

Si nulla sit conjectura quæ ducat alio, verba intelligenda sunt ex proprietate, non grammatica sed populari ex usu. If there be no conjecture which leads to a different result, words are to be understood, according to the proper meaning, not in a grammatical, but in a popular and ordinary sense.

Proprietates verborum observerandæ sunt. The proprieties of words (i. e. [sic] proper meanings of words) are to be observed.

Quæ ad unum finem locuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri. Words spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another.

¹*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 6th ed., s.v. “Maxim.” Hereinafter, italicized text in Latin followed by its underlined translation in English signifies a maxim of law, each of which, unless noted otherwise, is found in *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim,” pp. 2122–2168, defined and described as follows:

MAXIM. An established principle or proposition. A principle of law universally admitted, as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to natural reason. Coke defines a maxim to be “conclusion of reason,” and says . . . in another place: “A maxime is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without prooffe, argument, or discourse.” . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Maxime ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus probetur. A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest, and its authority the most certain, and because universally approved by all.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum. There is no disputing against or denying principles. *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 6th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

²cognitive dissonance . . . *noun* : psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and attitudes (as a fondness for smoking and a belief that it is harmful) held simultaneously *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Cognitive dissonance.”

As documented herein: Under cover of the War Between the States, Congress lay the groundwork to dupe and shanghai the American People into “voluntary” servitude (subjection to personal jurisdiction) through word trickery by (1) converting a certain common word³ with a popular and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary (“state,” and shortly thereafter, “State”), understood by all Americans as the fundamental building block of the American Republic and used as such in all foundational instruments of the Founding Fathers and Framers of the Constitution, into a term⁴ or term of art with a constitutionally opposite meaning, and (2) thereafter converting certain other everyday words into novel terms of art whose respective definition introduces and piggybacks onto the next in a daisy chain⁵ of terms, the legal meaning of none of which can be ascertained conclusively without reaching the original term from and upon which all others descend and depend and then deciphering the meaning of that particular definition.

For example, in order to determine the actual legal meaning of the definition of what most believe is an ordinary word, “driver,” but is rather a term of art, one must discern the meaning of:

- The definition of no less than seven other such interlinked terms of art; namely *person, individual, Federal personnel, State, state, home state, and United States*;
- Three legal terms, *natural person, municipal corporation, and franchise*.
- Three essential legal concepts, *domicile, residence, and legal residence*; and
- Seven obscure and esoteric but indispensable rules/principles/maxims of statutory interpretation, in order to determine the full extent of the meaning of all aforesaid terms defined by legislative statute.

That no United States Attorney or United States District Judge has ever failed to dismiss or close, summarily, for lack of jurisdiction, any case in which this writer assisted through preparation of a single document (with attachments) demonstrating the actual legal meaning of the terms of art “State” and “United States,” signed, sworn to, and executed by the defendant and filed into the record of the case, is confirmation of the veracity of the foregoing.

Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning.

Quod prius est verius est; et quod prius est tempore potius est jure. What is first is truest; and what comes first in time, is best in law.

The principal and truest part of the American Republic, *The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America* of July 4, 1776, to which all descendant congressional legislative instruments must hew in letter and spirit for their validity, guarantees the American People, in the Preamble thereof, the unalienable Right of Liberty; *to wit*:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the governed. . . . [Emphasis added.]

³word . . . a meaningful sound or combination of sounds that is a unit of language or its representation in a text . . . *Encarta World English Dictionary*, 1999 ed., s.v. “Word.”

⁴term . . . a particular word or combination of words, especially one used to mean something very specific or one used in a specialized area of knowledge or work . . . *Ibid*, s.v. “Term.”

⁵daisy chain . . . an interlinked series (as of events, items, or steps) . . . *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Daisy chain.”

The American People “secure the Blessings of Liberty.”

The People in their capacity as Sovereigns made and adopted the Constitution . . .

4 Wheat 402.

Sovereignty itself is, of course not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Woo Lee v. Hopkins, 118 US S.Ct. 356.

The sovereignty of the United States resides in the people, and Congress cannot invoke the sovereignty of the people to override their will as declared in the Constitution. . . .

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

The purpose of the *Constitution for the United States of America* of March 4, 1789, as declared in the Preamble thereto, among other things, is to secure in perpetuity for the author and source thereof, “We the People of the United States [⁶],” i.e., the American People, and their descendants the aforesaid unalienable Right of Liberty; *to wit*:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. . . . [Emphasis added.]

The unalienable / constitutional Right of Liberty.

Whereas, the subject of *liberty* plays such a predominant role in the history and nature of the American Republic and will and character of the American People, it is worth our time to examine exactly what it means; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

liberty . . . *noun* . . . Etymology . . . Latin *libertat-, libertas*, from *liber* free + *tat-, tas-* -ty . . . 1 : the quality or state of being free a (1) : freedom from usually external restraint or compulsion : the power to do as one pleases (2) : a condition of legal nonrestraint of natural powers . . . b : exemption from subjection to the will of another claiming ownership or services compare BONDAGE, SERFDOM, SLAVERY c : freedom from arbitrary or despotic control d : the power of choice : freedom from necessity : freedom from compulsion or constraint in the act of willing something . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [*Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Liberty”]

LIBERTY (Lat. *liber*, free; *libertas*, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without. . . .

Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men. . . .

Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Liberty”]

⁶Whereas, today the proper noun “United States” is a term of art and in nearly all usage means *District of Columbia* (only) (documented *infra*), on March 4, 1789, “United States” means the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under that certain Constitution of March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Enjoying the unalienable Right of Liberty under the common law,⁷ exempt from the will of any other, such as Congress, the American People of March 4, 1789, exercise “*the right which nature gives to all mankind . . . on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men,*” and enjoy “*the power of locomotion . . . without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.*”

Regarding personal liberty and the phrase “unless by due course of law,” *Black’s Law Dictionary* provides, in pertinent part:

—Due course of law. This phrase is synonymous with “due process of law,” or “the law of the land” . . . [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Due”]

—Due process of law. Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice. . . . [Ibid.]

—Law of the land. . . . It means due process of law warranted by the Constitution, by the common law adopted by the Constitution, or by statutes passed in pursuance of the Constitution. [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, s.v. “Law”]

As the author and source of law; in whose name and by whose authority Congress publish the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776; and who ordain and establish the Constitution March 4, 1789—i.e., the supreme political authority of the United States of America—the American People enjoy “*a condition of legal nonrestraint of natural powers,*” “*exemption from subjection to the will of another*”—such as the statutes enacted by Congress, which obtain only against those Americans over whom the Constitution, in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2), authorizes Congress to exercise power of personal legislative jurisdiction, the consent of which Americans to be governed must be freely given—and “*the power of locomotion . . . without imprisonment or restraint,*” uninterrupted by their servants in government *unless by due course of law for alleged trespass, under the common law, against the rights of another.*

“Jurisdiction”.

To ensure achievement of this goal the American People grant Congress power of certain types of legislative *jurisdiction* in different types of geographical areas. The word “jurisdiction” comes from two Latin roots and means, essentially, *the right to say* (the law); *to wit*:

jurisdiction . . . Latin *jurisdiction-*, *jurisdictio*, from *juris* (. . . *jus* right, law) + *diction-*, *dictio* act of saying . . .⁸ [U/L emphasis added.]

JURISDICTION . . . Power of governing or legislating. . . . *Jurisdiction*, in its most general sense, is the power to make, declare, or apply the law . . . *Jurisdiction* is limited to place or territory, persons, or to particular subjects. . . .⁹ [U/L emphasis added.]

Power of jurisdiction over “place or territory” is known as *territorial jurisdiction*; over “persons,” *personal jurisdiction*; and over “particular subjects,” *subject-matter jurisdiction*. When a legislative body exercises all three types of jurisdiction in a particular geographical area its power is said to be *exclusive* or *plenary*.¹⁰

⁷common law, *n.* [fr. Law French *commen ley* “common law”] . . . The body of law to which no constitution or statute applies . . . [U/L emphasis added.] *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Common law.”

Common Law, In Great Britain and the United States, the unwritten law, the law that receives its binding force from immemorial usage and universal reception, in distinction from the written, or statute law. That body of rules, principles, and customs which have been received from our ancestors and by which courts have been governed in their judicial decisions. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] *Webster’s Dictionary*, 1828 ed., s.v. “Common.”

⁸*Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Jurisdiction.”

⁹*Webster’s Dictionary*, 1828 ed., s.v. “Jurisdiction.”

¹⁰*plenary* . . . complete in every respect : ABSOLUTE, PERFECT, UNQUALIFIED *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Plenary.”

Congress: Limited legislative power *within the Union*, exclusive legislative power *without* .

In terms of legislative power *within the Union*,¹¹ the Constitution limits Congress to subject-matter jurisdiction only (no territorial or personal jurisdiction), and provides, in Art. 1 Sec. 8 Cl. 1–16 thereof, those subjects over which Congress may exercise such power; *to wit, in part*:

Article I . . . Section 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . To borrow money . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . To coin Money . . . To establish Post Offices . . . To declare War . . . To provide and maintain a Navy . . .

In certain geographical areas *without the Union*, however, the Constitution, in the same and another section, authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislative power; *to wit*:

Article I . . . Section 8. . . . The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . .

Article IV. . . . Section 3. . . . The Congress shall have Power to . . . make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . [Emphasis added.]

The phrase “Seat of the Government of the United States,” of course, refers to what will be the District of Columbia.¹² The phrases “all Places purchased . . .” and “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (*see n. 6, supra* for the March 4, 1789, meaning of “United States”) are self-explanatory.

Wherefore, there are two distinct types of geographical area over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise legislative power: (1) all that geographical area within the Union, over which Congress may exercise *subject-matter jurisdiction only*, and (2) all that geographical area without the Union (described above) over which Congress may exercise *territorial, personal, and subject-matter (exclusive) jurisdiction*.

Shortly after implementation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in 1821 confirms these two types of geographical area and the respective scope of congressional legislative power authorized within each; *to wit*:

It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .¹³

Notwithstanding the foregoing, today it is clear that something is wrong: Actors within all three branches of the Federal government routinely exercise power of personal jurisdiction over Americans residing in all parts of the Union, a power authorized by the Constitution only in the District of Columbia, “all Places purchased,” and “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Either: (1) such acts breach the jurisdictional limits established in the Declaration of Independence and venerated in the Constitution, or (2) there is some other constitutional provision, undetected essentially by all non-insiders, that allows for such conduct.

¹¹Hereinafter, “Union” is used in a geographical sense and means the aggregate geographical area occupied by the commonwealths united by and under the *Constitution for the United States of America* of March 4, 1789, numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959.

¹²Congressional provision for “a district of territory . . . for the permanent seat of the government of the United States” appears in the Act of July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. 130), and is referred to unofficially as the Territory of Columbia; later given the official name District of Columbia as of the Act of May 6, 1796 (1 Stat. 461).

¹³*Cohens v. Virginia*, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

Once upon a time, in a faraway land . . .

“How to snatch from the sovereign American People their Liberty and place them under the discretionary power of the executive that we control?” says one Bank of England goldsmith-banker to the other.

“Change the legal meaning of the word they use to describe the territory in which they enjoy their sovereignty, ‘state,’ to mean territory that we control via our hirelings in Congress,” says the other in response, “but do it during wartime (in an internal war that we create) so no one will notice. Thereafter, when they see that particular word in a legislative act, they will think it means the one thing, when ‘legally’ it means the other (as defined by us), and we can impose our will on them, through our servants on Capitol Hill—and get away with it—because of the American People’s foolish trusting nature.”

“The subject matter of the first legislative act to which we attach it should have broad public support, such as ‘civil rights for slaves’ or ‘freeing the slaves,’ so there is no real resistance,” says the first. “We can ‘free the slaves’ from involuntary servitude and at the same time, subject everyone—including the slaves—to voluntary servitude based on their erroneous belief that they reside in a ‘State’ and the ‘United States’ and are ‘citizens of the United States,’ all of which terms, of course, shall mean District of Columbia.”

“Not everyone will buy it; we need to get them all to enter into a binding contract without knowing it and from which there is no apparent escape—and the contract should ‘rescue’ them from something, so they are predisposed to agree to whatever we offer. To begin with, why not give them loans of easy credit through the banking monopoly we shall institute in the District of Columbia in 1913 and persuade them to borrow and purchase stock in the stock market, because ‘everyone knows the stock market is going up’—it costs us nothing to do so [¹⁴] and we can secure the loans with their land and property—and then crash the stock market, contract the availability of credit so the economy dives into a depression, and foreclose and evict them from their farms and homes and toss them out on the street, just like we did in ancient Rome,” the second replies.

“Most excellent,” says the first. “Then we can pretend to save them from potential financial destitution through what appears to be a personal retirement program (for which they need to apply, of course), but is actually a government franchise, with political rights and duties—the right to receive (but not realize) retirement benefits, and the duty to pay income tax and payroll taxes for the retirement of other franchisees and administration of the program, which our puppets in Congress legislate into existence under local powers of legislation of the corporate District of Columbia (which retirement program is domiciled in territory over which Congress exercise absolute exclusive personal legislative power and jurisdiction)—thereby establishing the franchisees’ residence, for legal purposes, in the District of Columbia and making them the subject of all legislation therein and nullifying and defeating the provisions of their supreme legislative instrument, the Declaration of Independence, whereby we effectively usurp their Liberty without them even knowing what happened!” he says in conclusion.¹⁵

¹⁴The Federal Reserve is a fount of credit, not of capital. *New York Times*, January 18, 1920, editorial page, quoted in Eustace Mullins, *Secrets of the Federal Reserve: The London Connection*, Jekyll Island ed. and author’s special 70th birthday ed. (Staunton, Va.: Bankers Research Institute, 1993), 119. [For a comprehensive account of the nature and origin of what is called *fractional-reserve lending*, see Thomas Clark Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse* (Self-published: January 3, 2013), <https://archive.org/details/PurgingAmericaOfTheMatrix>, Link 2, browser-pages 15–25.]

¹⁵Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, browser-page 46 (cited *supra*, n. 14).

A policy of stealth and insidious¹⁶ incrementalism¹⁷.

Statutes in derogation [¹⁸] of common law must be strictly construed.¹⁹

The below statutory citations omit superfluous language in strict conformance with “Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation,”²⁰ as well as other provisions thereof immaterial to the purpose of this exercise (U/L emphasis added in all citations.).

June 30, 1864: SEC. 182. *And be it further enacted*, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia . . .²¹

April 9, 1866: *Be it enacted* . . . That all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens . . . shall have the same right, in every State . . .²²

February 21, 1871: *Be it enacted* . . . That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate [²³] for municipal [²⁴] purposes, and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plea and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation . . .

SEC. 18. *And be it further enacted*, That the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District . . .²⁵

March 9, 1878: SEC. 3140. The word “State,” when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia . . .²⁶

February 3, 1913: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.²⁷

¹⁵*insidious* . . . acting by imperceptible degrees : having a gradual, cumulative, and usually hidden effect
Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Insidious.”

¹⁷*incrementalism* . . . a policy or advocacy of a policy of political or social change in small increments
Ibid, s.v. “Incrementalism.”

¹⁸DEROGATION. The partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a subsequent act which limits its scope or impairs its utility and force. . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Derogation.”

¹⁹*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

²⁰*A Dictionary of Law*, 7th ed., Jonathan Law and Elizabeth Martin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), s.v. “Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory,” quoted in Nelson, *How to use a car without the need for a driver’s license*, <https://archive.org/details/PurgingAmericaOfTheMatrix>, Link 5, browser-page 9.

²¹“An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes,” Ch. 173, Sec. 182, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864.

²²“An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication,” Ch. 31, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 27, April 9, 1866.

²³BODY CORPORATE. A corporation. *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Body Corporate.”

²⁴MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation . . . Ibid, s.v. “Municipal corporation.”

²⁵“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, Sec. 18, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, i.e., Sec. 2 of the *Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74*); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, Sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

²⁶*Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873–’74*, Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, Ch. 1, Officers of Internal Revenue, p. 601, approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878.

- September 8, 1916: SEC. 15. That the word “State” . . . when used in this title shall be construed to include any Territory, [and] the District of Columbia . . .
 SEC. 200. That when used in this title— . . . The term “United States” means only the States . . .²⁸
- August 14, 1935: The Social Security Act (Act of August 14, 1935) . . .
 TITLE VIII . . . INCOME TAX ON EMPLOYEES
 SECTION 801. In addition to other taxes, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon the income of every individual a tax . . .
 SEC. 802 (a). The tax imposed by section 801 shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid. . . .
 SECTION 1101.
 (a) When used in this Act-
 (1) The term State . . . includes [²⁹] Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia.
 (2) The term United States when used in a geographical sense means the States . . .
 (3) The term person means an individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, or a corporation. . . .
 (b) The terms includes and including when used in a definition contained in this Act shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.
- As of this writing: United States Code . . .
 TITLE 5 – GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES . . .
 Sec. 551 – Definitions . . .
 (2) “person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation . . .
 Sec. 552a – Records maintained on Individuals
 (a) Definitions . . .
 (2) the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States . . .
 (13) the term “Federal personnel” means . . . individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States . . .

²⁷Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution. (Note: The 16th Amendment is inapposite, false, and fraudulent as a constitutional amendment per se for two reasons: (1) As demonstrated herein, “State” means District of Columbia (or one of the Territories), whereby the amendment has applicability only in Federal territory, i.e., *without* the Union, and (2) Federal criminal charges against a Union resident in 1916 for an alleged tax crime requires *personal jurisdiction*, a power not authorized by the Constitution.)

²⁸“An Act To increase the revenue, and for other purposes,” Ch. 463, Sec. 200, 39 Stat. 756, Sept. 8, 1916.

²⁹Whereas, “includes” is a Social Security Act term (§ 1101(b)), we must determine its meaning to see which other things are comprehended as a “State.” The definition of “includes and including” (§ 1101(b)) also appears, verbatim, in the Internal Revenue Code and other Federal statutes and is a hybrid composite of two of the principal rules of statutory interpretation, (1) *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, and (2) *ejusdem generis; to wit:*

“(5) The rule *ejusdem generis* (of the same kind): when a list of specific items belonging to the same class is followed by general words (as in ‘cats, dogs, and other animals’), the general words are to be treated as confined to other items of the same class (in this example, to other *domestic* animals).

“(6) The rule *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other): when a list of specific items is not followed by general words it is to be taken as exhaustive. For example, ‘weekends and public holidays’ excludes ordinary weekdays. [U/L emphasis added.] *A Dictionary of Law*, 7th ed., Law and Martin, eds., s.v. “Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory” (*see n. 19, p. 7* hereof for full source reference).

The District of Columbia and Territories of Alaska and Hawaii are all “Territory or other Property of the United States” whose residents are citizens of the United States. On August 14, 1935, the only other “Territory or other Property of the United States” whose residents are citizens of the United States, is Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Wherefore, the Social Security Act term (1) “State” means the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, and (2) “United States,” the collective of the foregoing five “States.”

TITLE 18 – CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE . . .

§5. . . . The term “United States” . . . in a territorial sense, includes all places . . . subject to the [*territorial*] jurisdiction of the United States . . .

AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES . . .

§31. . . . (a) . . . (9) . . . The term “State” means . . . the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth [³⁰], territory, or possession of the United States. . . .

TITLE 26 – INTERNAL REVENUE CODE . . .

CHAPTER 21—FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT . . .

Sec. 3121. . . . (e) . . . For purposes of this chapter –

(1) . . . The term “State” includes [³¹] the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

(2) . . . The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. . . .³²

Sec. 7701. Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed . . .

(9) . . . The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States [³³] and the District of Columbia.

(10) . . . The term “State” shall be construed to include the District of Columbia . . .

(c) . . . The terms “includes” and “including” when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined [³⁴]

TITLE 28 – JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE . . .

CHAPTER 176—FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE [³⁵] . . .

§3002. . . . As used in this chapter . . .

(2) “Court” means any court created by the Congress of the United States [³⁶] excluding the United States Tax Court. . . .

(15) “United States” means . . . a Federal [District of Columbia municipal] corporation . . .

³⁰Commonwealths of Puerto Rico, Northern Mariana Islands: <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm>.

³¹Upon application of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter “IRC”) term “includes,” defined *supra*, n. 29, this definition also comprehends the only other *insular U.S. possession with its own government and tax system*, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; *to wit*:

U.S. possessions can be divided into two groups: 1. Those that have their own governments and their own tax systems (Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) . . . [Emphasis added.] Secretary of the Treasury, “Persons Employed In a U.S. Possession / Territory - FIT,” IRS.gov, <http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Persons-Employed-In-U.S.-Possessions>.

³²*Ibid.*

³³This, the controlling IRC definition of “United States,” references “States” (plural) but names only the District of Columbia. Wherefore we must refer to the controlling IRC definition of “State,” IRC § 7701(a)(10).

Because IRC § 7701(a)(10), specifies only the District of Columbia—which is only *construed* to be a State—but uses the IRC term “includes,” there must be at least one other “State.” Wherefore, we must defer to the instruction in the preamble thereto: “*When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed . . .*”

The definition of “State” is *otherwise distinctly expressed* in IRC § 3121(e)(1) and, per analysis, *supra*, n. 31, as confirmed by the Secretary of the Treasury: Under IRC the States of the United States are (1) the District of Columbia, (2) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, (3) the Virgin Islands, (4) Guam, (5) American Samoa, and (6) the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and no other thing.

³⁴See n. 29, *supra*, for interpretation of the meaning of the IRC term “includes.”

³⁵This chapter includes, among other things, collection of every type of Federal tax, such as income tax.

³⁶Whereas, there is only one *Congress*, it would appear that “of the United States” is superfluous. However, Congress wear two jurisdictionally distinct legislative hats: (1) *national*, and (2) *municipal*. Per 28 USC § 3002(15), “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” e.g., the *District of Columbia municipal corporation*.

Wherefore, every United States District Court is a *District of Columbia municipal corporation legislative tribunal*, as authorized by the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2).

Why everything NSA, CIA, HSA et al do is “legal”.

As mentioned earlier, the difficulty in conveying the nature of what is going on to the man on the street is his subconscious disbelief of what he is reading vis-à-vis life as he knows it: No matter what he may read in Federal statutes as the “law,” he still believes that he was born and lives in a *State* and the *United States* and is a *citizen of the United States*. The “logicalness” of the meaning of *words* he has used his entire life, as opposed to the illogic of the meaning of their respective counterparts as Federal *terms*, and the arrangement of other things, such as his thought processes and conversational speech, outweighs any obscure statutory reference.

Such is a testament to the cunning of the designers of the trap.

The accuracy of the proofs presented herein and elsewhere by this author, however, is not the subject of doubt of any United States Attorney or United States District Judge; rather, it is the quintessence of the daily life of each: Legal subjugation of the American People through word-trickery and measured stealth resulting in physical restraint or compelled performance.

The above statutory definitions reveal why Congress own the title “Most Despised Class in America.”³⁷ Whereas, it may appear they violate the Constitution on a routine basis, it is very likely that “legally” neither they nor anyone else in the Government of the United States—a/k/a Government of the District of Columbia—ever do except by mistake; *e.g.*:

Obama Administration officials and leading lawmakers . . . staunchly defended the NSA after [Edward J.] Snowden began leaking classified documents . . .

Supporters say that the NSA operated within U.S. law and that its only mistake was getting caught doing what spies do.

Members of congressional oversight committees had been briefed on the NSA’s programs to collect and archive U.S. telephone calling records, and most stood by the agency when the news broke in June. [Emphasis added.] [*Los Angeles Times*, “Turning point looms for NSA,” November 3, 2013, A3]

Obama Administration officials insist that the metadata program [³⁸] is vital because it assembles a “haystack” that makes it possible for a computer search to extract the “needle” of evidence leading to the perpetrators of a terrorist plot. The Government persuaded the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that such a dragnet [³⁹] was legal under a section of the Patriot Act authorizing the acquisition of records reasonably believed to be “relevant to an authorized investigation” of espionage or terrorism. [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, “Reining in the NSA,” November 5, 2013, A8]

Courtesy of the convoluted and carefully crafted duplicitous definition and meaning of “State” and “United States” in the Patriot Act and everywhere else, Congress evade and defeat the Constitution not by the *letter* per se thereof but the *spirit*, as said terms have a polar-opposite meaning to the same popular and ordinary words used by the Framers.

By way of the hidden meaning of these terms of art, Congress operate in broad daylight not as a national but municipal legislative body under authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), which affords them dictatorial control of the District of Columbia and all residents (whether actual or legal) thereof via *legislative absolutism* (totalitarianism).

³⁷Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.

In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.

Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . . [Emphasis added.] *Los Angeles Times*, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3.

³⁸The “metadata program” refers to an earlier passage in the same *Los Angeles Times* article; i.e., “the bulk collection of telephone metadata — information about the source, destination and duration of telephone calls but not their contents.”

³⁹Ibid.

Social Security, the ultimate entrapment scheme⁴⁰ used to ensnare and shanghai unsuspecting Americans into legal residence in the District of Columbia, is an instrumentality of the District of Columbia municipal corporation, not the national government established by the Constitution. The legislation establishing Social Security deliberately excludes all members of the Union from the meaning of “United States” and “State” as used in the Constitution; *to wit*:

Social Security Act of August 14, 1935 . . .

SECTION 1101. (a) When used in this Act— (1) The term State . . . includes [the Territory of] Alaska, [the Territory of] Hawaii, and the District of Columbia. (2) The term United States when used in a geographical sense means the States . . .

(b) The terms includes and including when used in a definition contained in this Act shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined. [Emphasis added.]

Use of “includes” (*see* n. 29, *supra*, for interpretation of the meaning of this term) in § 1101(a) means that “State” also comprehends the only two other geographical areas whose residents are “citizens of the United States” on August 14, 1935: Puerto Rico (as of 1917) and the Virgin Islands (as of 1927). Legally, Union residents are not eligible to participate in Social Security.

All important establishments and activities of the Municipal Government require Congressional sanction . . . Yet in a legal sense they are not instrumentalities of the Federal Government, but are under direct ownership and control of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation . . . The over all [*sic*] control by Congress of the Federal District as the seat of the national government (U.S.Const. [*sic*] Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 17) does not affect the distinct identity of the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation. [Emphasis added.] [180 F.2d 38, *Wham v. United States*, No. 10076, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 128 (1950)]

Wherefore, in the interests of erudition,⁴¹ hereinafter the following definitions apply:

- “United States of America” means the collective of the commonwealths united by and under that certain Constitution ordained and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “Constitution”), and thereafter, numbering 50 at present; also known as *the Union* and *the Republic*;
- “*Union-state*” means the geographical area occupied by one of the respective component commonwealths united by and under the Constitution, or the 37 others so-united since then, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959;
- “United States” is a term in conformance with its meaning as defined in contemporary American legislative statutes; *specifically*: Every official, stand-alone use of the proper noun “United States” in a (1) governmental, political, or commercial sense means the District of Columbia (only), and (2) geographical sense means the collective of District of Columbia and certain of the territories; e.g., under Title 18 of the United States Code there are 20 States of the United States, under Titles 26 and 42 there are only six; and
- “State” and “state” are terms in conformance with their respective meaning as defined in contemporary American legislative statutes; *specifically*: Every official, stand-alone use of “State” or “state” as a proper noun means either (1) the District of Columbia (only), or (2) the District of Columbia or one of the territories.

⁴⁰The Social Security “personal retirement program” has all the essential elements of a Ponzi scheme. For demonstration of this fact, *see* Thomas Clark Nelson, *Purging America of the Matrix* (Self-published, October 22, 2012), <https://archive.org/details/PurgingAmericaOfTheMatrix>, Link 3, browser-pages 15–17.

⁴¹*erudition* . . . the practice of scholarly study : the pursuit of learning *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Erudition.”

The spirit of congressional legislative statutes.

The specific language of the Federal definitions cited above in pages 7–9 is deliberate and calculated—and there are 69 other different definitions of “United States” in the United States Code, as well, all of which however, upon interpretation, mean nothing more than (1) the District of Columbia (only), or (2) the District of Columbia and certain of the territories.

The intent to shunt any investigation by any non-insider seeking to understand statutes, whether Federal or State, finds identity in the philosophy known as *obscurantism*; *to wit*:

ob-scu-rant-ism . . . *n.* 1. Opposition to the increase and spread of knowledge. 2. Deliberate obscurity or evasion of clarity. [*Random House Dictionary*, coll. ed., s.v. “Obscurantism”]

The primary tactic of the obscurantists who author all Federal and State legislation is *circumlocution*; more specifically, the rhetorical tools of *pleonasm* and *tautology*; *to wit*:

circumlocution . . . 1 a : The use of an unnecessarily large number of words to express an idea : indirect or roundabout expression b : evasion in speech . . .

ple'o-nasm . . . *Rhet.* The use of more words than are needed for the full expression of a thought; redundancy, as in saying “the very identical thing itself” . . . a violation of grammatical precision. . . . [*Funk & Wagnalls Dictionary*, 1903 ed., s.v. “Pleonasm”]

tau-tol'o-gy . . . *Rhet.* That form of pleonasm in which the same word or idea is unnecessarily repeated; unnecessary repetition, whether in word or sense . . . [Ibid, s.v. “Tautology”]

Who is the subject of congressional legislation?

Exercise of personal jurisdiction over any American in any American court for an alleged crime requires that any such court forum first have territorial jurisdiction; *to wit*:

forum . . . 2 a : a judicial body or assembly . . . b : the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — *National Law Journal* [*Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law*, 1996 ed., s.v. “Forum”]

territorial jurisdiction. . . . Jurisdiction over cases arising in or involving persons residing within a defined territory. . . . [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Jurisdiction”]

Whereas, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001” (hereinafter the “Patriot Act”), representing many thousands of man-hours and enacted into law 45 days after the events of September 11, 2001, operates substantially as a revision of the United States Code, amending thousands of provisions thereof, primarily those of the Federal criminal code, Title 18 *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, appears to apply to all Americans, decryption of the jurisdictional provisions thereof rather reveals that this is not the case; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

SEC. 802. DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

(a) DOMESTIC TERRORISM DEFINED.—Section 2331 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— . . .

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“(5) the term ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that—

“(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; . . .

“(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”⁴² [U/L emphasis added.]

⁴²“An Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes,” Public Law 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, 376, October 26, 2001, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf.

Wherefore, to determine who may be charged with “domestic terrorism” we must establish the meaning of the Title 18 USC terms “State” and “United States” and, for purposes of residence and subjection to the criminal laws thereof, the geographical area over which the United States is authorized to exercise territorial (*and therefore personal*) jurisdiction.

Title 18 USC provides, in Section 31(a)(9) thereof:

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

Before, however, we can determine the full extent of the meaning of “State” we must account for another Title 18 term within the definition, “United States,” defined in Section 5 thereof:

The term “United States”, as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.

Whereas, (1) in a *territorial sense*, power of jurisdiction (a) obtains with any type of land mass, of which there are only two, continental and insular, and (b) always extends a certain distance into any adjoining waters,⁴³ inclusion of the general phrase “*and waters, continental or insular,*” brings no new meaning to the definition of “United States” and is therefore superfluous and may be excluded from the definition without changing the meaning thereof; and (2) as of October 1, 1979, (a) the United States returns to Panama approximately 60% of what is known as the “Canal Zone,” (b) the Canal Zone ceases to exist in name, and (c) the remaining 40% is dubbed the *Canal Area*, and as of 12:00 Noon December 31, 1999, the United States returns to Panamanian rule all interest in the Panama Canal and Canal Area: Inclusion of the phrase “*except the Canal Zone*” operates to imply that the United States retains interest in a former U.S. territory defunct for more than 33 years, an inference without factual basis and therefore superfluous and misleading and which may be omitted without changing the meaning of the 18 USC § 5 definition of “United States.”

Wherefore, the foregoing leaves the following language with which to determine the full extent of the meaning of the Title 18 USC § 5 term “United States”:

The term “United States,” as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution provide that only (1) the District of Columbia, (2) “all Places purchased . . .,” and (3) “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Notwithstanding that the said definition uses “United States” to define “United States,” essentially rendering it moot, the above distillation nevertheless agrees in substance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and it is reasonable to conclude that 18 USC § 5 *United States defined* comprehends only those places subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States as aforesaid.

Returning to “State,” the Title 18 definition thereof provides that “the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States” is a *State*; but we are left to determine the meaning of the general expression “*a State of the United States*”; *to wit*:

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. [Emphasis added.]

Just as “*an Emirate of the United Arab Emirates*” does not define “Emirate,” “*a State of the United States*” does not define “State.”

⁴³For example: Whereas, the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution (Articles 1 § 8 and 4 § 3(2)) are devoid of express claim of territorial jurisdiction over any of the waters adjoining the Union; such jurisdiction nevertheless is implied and obtains over all such waters.

The particular rule/principle of statutory interpretation whose application clears up the meaning of the unclear word/phrase “a State of the United States” is *noscitur a sociis*; *to wit*, in *pertinent part*:

noscitur a sociis . . . [Latin “it is known by its associates”] A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. [Emphasis added.] [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Noscitur a sociis”]

The words immediately surrounding the unclear phrase “*a State of the United States*” in the Title 18 USC definition of “State” are “The term ‘State’ means . . . the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.”

Whereas, we know from Article 1 § 8(17) and the territorial clause, Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution that the District of Columbia and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States are all geographical areas other than “*Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings*” over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise power of territorial legislative jurisdiction: The general expression “a State of the United States” in the Title 18 USC definition of “State” means any geographical area other than “Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings” over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise territorial legislative power—and the full extent of the meaning of said definition consists of the following:

The District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS (*infra*, n. 44), Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.⁴⁴

Wherefore: The 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of “State”:

1. Comprehends only the (a) District of Columbia, and (b) above 19 insular territories/possessions.
2. Excludes all *Union-states* united (a) March 4, 1789, by and under the Constitution, as contemplated by the Framers thereof, and (b) all so-united since then.
3. Uses the general expression “a State of the United States,” a pleonasm and tautology and instance of the practice of obscurantism that, investigation reveals, is employed in every other Federal definition of “State.”
4. Violates the literal rule of statutory interpretation by giving a word a constitutionally opposite meaning to the only meaning of which it is reasonably capable, *to wit*:
Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule. [*See* n. 20, *supra*]
5. Violates the golden rule of statutory interpretation by disallowing an ordinary word its ordinary meaning, resulting in absurdity; *to wit*:

Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical words their technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is the golden rule. [*Ibid*]

⁴⁴U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) “All OIA Jurisdictions,” and (2) “U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm>, (2) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm>, respectively.

Other than the (1) pleonasm, tautology, and instance of the practice of obscurantism that is the phrase “*and waters, continental and insular,*” and (2) misleading language “*except the Canal Zone*” in the 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of “State,” each of the remaining types of geographical area named therein is of a type for which the Constitution provides for exercise power of territorial (and therefore personal) legislative jurisdiction by Congress, specifically, the District of Columbia (Article 1 § 8(17)) and “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Article 4 § 3(2)).

Wherefore, strictly legally speaking, under the Patriot Act:

The only Americans who are liable to a criminal charge for “domestic terrorism” are those who are subject to the criminal laws of (1) the District of Columbia, or (2) one of the 19 insular possessions/territories defined as a “State” in 18 USC § 31(a)(9), over whom Congress have power of personal legislative jurisdiction by virtue of said Americans residence “*within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States*” (Patriot Act § 802(a)(4)).

“Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation”⁴⁵:
Deliverance from “voluntary” servitude.

All statutory definitions of “State” (and, as we shall see *infra*, “state”) and “United States” are *in pari materia* with each other, i.e., perforce must agree with each other in substance in order to prevent contradictions in the law and fracturing of the system⁴⁶; *to wit*:

(7) The rule *in pari materia* (on the like matter): when a prior Act is found to be “on the like matter” it can be used as an aid in construing the statute in question . . .⁴⁷

in pari materia . . . [Latin “in the same matter”] . . . On the same subject; relating to the same matter.

• It is a canon of construction that statutes that are *in pari materia* may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject. . . .⁴⁸

Standard application of the eight straightforward but generally unknown “Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation” to any and all Federal definitions of the former *words*, now *terms of art*, “State” and “United States,” reveals that:

1. No *Union-state* is a State of the United States;
2. No State is located within the United States of America;
3. Every so-called State is Federal property (territorial property of the United States);
4. Both “State” and “United States,” for purposes of power of personal legislative jurisdiction over the American People who authorized the Declaration of Independence (“*the good People of these Colonies*”) and ordained the Constitution (“*We the People of the United States*”) and their posterity, in the final analysis, distill down to **District of Columbia**;
5. The United States is not part of the United States of America; and
6. When legislating, Congress wear, almost exclusively, the hat not of a *national* but rather *territorial*-type legislative body under authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), with “local powers of legislation” (*see n. 24, supra*) in capacity of legislative body of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

⁴⁵See n. 20, *supra*.

⁴⁶This fact constitutes prima facie evidence of single authorship, by the selfsame unit or body, of all State and Federal legislation, statutes, code, law, rules, regulations, etc.

⁴⁷See n. 20, *supra*, Rule 7.

⁴⁸*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “*In pari materia*.”

Acts of Congress under “local powers of legislation” of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

A municipal corporation is “A public corporation, created by government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation . . .” (*supra*, n. 24). When Congress legislate in behalf of the District of Columbia municipal corporation (constructive Board of Directors thereof), they do so as a territorial (municipal) legislative body and are indistinguishable from “*the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress assembled*” of the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, and “*Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*” of every congressional legislative act since that time—except for one telltale characteristic: **the geographical area over which each respective legislative act asserts power of territorial and personal jurisdiction**; to wit:

The District of Columbia municipal corporation⁴⁹ enjoys territorial and personal (and subject-matter) jurisdiction within the exterior limits of (1) the geographical District of Columbia, (2) “*all Places purchased*” by the corporate District of Columbia, and (3) all “*Territory or other Property belonging to*” the corporate District of Columbia.

Whereas, neither the Founding Fathers in the Declaration of Independence nor the Framers in the Constitution treat of “State” or “United States” as anything but a popular and ordinary *word*. Congress today pervert the meaning of these by transmuting them into terms of art, so legislative acts appear to conform to the two aforesaid foundational instruments but instead allow Congress to legislate for the for-profit District of Columbia municipal corporation without detection.

When, in a particular legislative act, Congress assert power of territorial and personal legislative jurisdiction over what is defined to be a State and the residents thereof, it is a certainty that one of two things is the case; either Congress are acting in capacity of a:

1. National legislative body and willfully violating and exceeding the territorial and personal jurisdictional limitations set forth in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution, an act—as demonstrated elsewhere in this webpage—of constructive treason; or
2. Territorial (municipal) legislative body and exercising power of territorial and personal legislative jurisdiction as authorized by Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution over territory/property belonging to the “United States,” defined now to mean the *District of Columbia*.

“*Fides servanda. Good faith must be observed.*” Wherefore, the correct choice is 2.

Corollary⁵⁰: Any congressional legislative act the assertion of power of territorial and personal legislative jurisdiction of which purports to *extend to a State and those who reside there*, in apparent contravention of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution, signifies that: (1) “State” is a term of art and means either (a) the District of Columbia (only), or (b) the District of Columbia or one of the territories, (2) Congress are acting in capacity of a territorial (municipal)—not a national—legislative body under authority of Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution, and (3) the subject legislation is that of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

⁴⁹“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, i.e., § 2 of the *Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74*); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, Ch. 332, Sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

⁵⁰corollary . . . a proposition that follows on one just demonstrated and that requires no additional proof . . . *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Corollary.”

Contemporary examples of legislative acts of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed.

Patriot Act.

As shown *supra*, the Patriot Act is legislation of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).

This Act provides six different definitions of “State,” three of “United States”; *e.g.*:

TITLE I—QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS . . .

Subtitle D—Available Coverage Choices for All Americans

PART I—ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS . . .

SEC. 1304. RELATED DEFINITIONS. . . .

(d) STATE.—In this title, the term “State” means each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.⁵¹ [Emphasis added.]

Because “50 States” is not defined in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter the “Affordable Care Act”) we are left to work with “States,” which is a term, but also the subject of the instant definition, thereby rendering “each of the 50 States” a phrase of uncertain meaning to which we must apply Rule 8 of “Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (*see* n. 20, *supra*, or p. 14 hereof for the *Black’s Law Dictionary* definition of the same rule) in order to determine the meaning of “State”; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

(8) The rule *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . .

The words surrounding the phrase “each of the 50 States” are “*the term ‘State’ means the District of Columbia.*” This meaning (1) comports with the territorial and personal legislative jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution, and (2) is *in pari materia* (*supra*, nn. 47–48) with the other five definitions of “State” in the Affordable Care Act.

Wherefore: Title I of the Affordable Care Act obtains only against residents of the District of Columbia and the said Act is legislation of the corporate District of Columbia.

Regarding the meaning of the undefined expression the “50 States,” most Americans do not know that (supporting citations of authority follow immediately hereinafter):

1. There are two types of residence, actual (physical), and *legal*, both of which may exist in the same place at the same time or independently of each other;
2. Legal residence is also known as *domicile*;
3. The domicile (legal residence) of any American holding a franchise from the Government of the United States is, for certain legal purposes such as taxation and licensing, the seat of the Government of the United States, *i.e., the District of Columbia*;
4. The right (entitlement) to receive benefits through Social Security, a retirement program of the Government of United States, is a *franchise*;
5. Anyone holding a Social Security franchise is a member of the class defined in law as *Federal personnel* and a *United States Government employee*;
6. The United States is also known as *the District of Columbia*;

⁵¹“An Act entitled The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” H. R. 3590—54, Public Law 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, March 23, 2010, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf.

7. A resident, actual or legal, of the District of Columbia is also known as a citizen of the United States;
8. A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the federal government and defined in law to be an individual and person;
9. Individuals and persons, as residents (actual or legal) of the District of Columbia, are the subject of all legislation within the District of Columbia;
10. Legislative acts of the District of Columbia municipal corporation, which is “A public corporation, created by government for political purposes” (*supra*, n. 24) and domiciled in the District of Columbia, obtain against all individuals and persons;
11. Every American who has the right (entitlement) to receive Social Security benefits is the subject of all legislation of the District of Columbia municipal corporation;
12. Despite legal residence (domicile) in the District of Columbia, many individuals and persons also have physical residence in one of the 50 respective Union-states;
13. “Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed” and the “50 States” are, literally, the 50 District of Columbias;
14. The “50 District of Columbias” are the 50 political societies of legal residents of the District of Columbia (Social Security franchisees, Federal personnel, United States Government employees, individuals, persons, citizens of the United States, and citizens of the federal government) who physically reside within the exterior limits of one of the 50 respective Union-states;
15. The expression “50 States” is a general, undefined expression coined by Congress acting in capacity of territorial (municipal) legislative body of the District of Columbia municipal corporation, whose nature is political, not geographical;
16. Every so-called “State of . . .”, e.g., State of North Dakota, State of Maine, etc., is a political subdivision of the District of Columbia, not a geographical area.

Respective citations of authority for the foregoing statements of fact are, in pertinent part (U/L emphasis added in all citations.):

Residence. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. . . . *Residence* usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; *domicile* usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time, but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. Cf. DOMICILE. . . .⁵²

domicile . . . The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed . . . legal residence. . . .⁵³

“[D]omicile . . . is a conception of law employed for the purpose of establishing a connection for certain legal purposes between an individual and the legal system of the territory with which he either has the closest connection in fact or is considered by law so to have because of his dependence on some other person.” R.H. Graveson, *Conflict of Laws* 185, 7th ed. 1974.⁵⁴

FRANCHISE. A special privilege conferred by government upon an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally. . . . In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises. . . .⁵⁵

⁵²*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Residence.”

⁵³*Ibid.*, s.v. “Domicile”

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Franchise”

United States Code . . .

Title 5 – GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES

PART I—THE AGENCIES GENERALLY . . .

CHAPTER 5—ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE . . .

SUBCHAPTER II—ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE . . .

§552a. Records maintained on individuals

(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

(13) the term “Federal personnel” means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits).⁵⁶

Uniform Commercial Code . . .

ARTICLE 9 – SECURED TRANSACTIONS . . .

Part 3. Perfection and Priority

Subpart 1. Law Governing Perfection and Priority . . .

§ 9-307. LOCATION OF DEBTOR. . . .

(h) Location of United States.⁵⁷

The United States is located in the District of Columbia.

United States Code . . .

Title 28 – JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

PART VI—PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER 176—FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE

SUBCHAPTER A—DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS . . .

§3002. DEFINITIONS

As used in this chapter: . . .

(15) “United States” means—

(A) a Federal [District of Columbia municipal] corporation; . . .⁵⁸

A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the federal government . . . [Kitchens v. Steele, D.C.W.D. Mo., 112 F.Supp. 383 (1953)]

§552a. Records maintained on individuals

(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section— . . .

(2) the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; . . .⁵⁹

§551. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this subchapter— . . .

(2) “person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; . . .⁶⁰

SEC. 18. And be it further enacted, That the legislative power of the District [of Columbia] shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District . . .⁶¹

⁵⁶U.S. Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title5/html/USCODE-2009-title5-partI.htm>.

⁵⁷Cornell University Law School, Legal information Institute, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/9-307>.

⁵⁸U.S. Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title28/html/USCODE-2011-title28.htm>

⁵⁹See n. 56, *supra*, for full source reference.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871.

Homeland Security Act of 2002.

This Act provides one definition of “United States,” two different definitions of “State,” e.g.:

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act, the following definitions apply: . . .

(14) The term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States. . . .

(16)(A) The term “United States”, when used in a geographic sense, means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, any possession of the United States, and any waters within the jurisdiction of the United States.⁶² [Emphasis added.]

Because § 2(14) of the Act uses “*any State of the United States*” to define “State,” it is unclear what said phrase means. Application of *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates), allows us to determine its meaning by the words immediately surrounding it; *to wit*:

The term “State” means the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States.

Wherefore, the said definition of “State” excludes all *Union-states* and comprehends only certain territory/property that is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Whereas, (1) the § 2(16)(A) definition of “United States” provides for power of territorial jurisdiction (“in a geographic sense”) over “*any State of the United States*,” and (2) the things comprehended by the term “State,” set forth *supra*—do not include any *Union-state*, only geographical areas subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States: We know from our Corollary (*supra*, n. 50) that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is a territorial, not national, legislative act and that power of personal legislative jurisdiction thereunder does not extend to residents of *Union-states*, only those of the above territorial-type “States,” and as of date of enactment November 25, 2002, Congress act in capacity of legislative body of the District of Columbia municipal corporation.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

This Act provides, in pertinent part:

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS . . .

TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE . . .

Subtitle D—Readiness

SEC. 331. INTERGOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

(a) AGREEMENTS AUTHORIZED.—Chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“§ 2336. Intergovernmental support agreements with State and local governments . . .

“(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: . . .

“(3) The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands, and any agency or instrumentality of a State.”⁶³ [Emphasis added.]

⁶²“An Act To establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes,” Public Law 107–296, H.R. 5005, 116 Stat. 2135, 2141, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ296/pdf/PLAW-107publ296.pdf.

⁶³“An Act To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes,” H. R. 4310—66, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310enr.pdf.

Whereas, the phrase “*any agency or instrumentality of a State*” in “§ 2336(e)(3)” of § 331(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 uses “State” to define “State,” the meaning of said phrase is unclear. Again, Rule 8 of “Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (n. 20, *supra*), *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates), allows us to determine the full extent of meaning of the definition despite this discrepancy:

- (8) The rule *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . .

Accounting for the said unclear phrase “any agency or instrumentality of a State,” the surrounding (remaining) words are:

The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands.

Whereas, the subject definition uses the verb “*includes*” and not “*means*” (as do the sections of the Patriot Act, Affordable Care Act, and Homeland Security Act interpreted above) to define “State,” we must account for the possibility of other things not named in the definition but nevertheless comprehended thereby. Rule 6 of “Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (n. 20, *supra*) provides:

- (6) The rule *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other): when a list of specific items is not followed by general words it is to be taken as exhaustive. For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.

Because the list of specific items in the definition is not followed by general words we know that the list is exhaustive as given and that the “§ 2336(e)(3)” definition of “State” of § 331(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act means the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands and no other thing.

Whereas, the subject definition comprehends only certain geographical areas subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States we know, and our Corollary (n. 50, *supra*) confirms, that (1) the only Americans who are the subject of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 are those residing in the geographical areas named therein, (2) notwithstanding that the said Act defines certain geographical areas as a “State,” the meaning of that *term of art* excludes all *Union-states*, and (3) the said Act is the product of Congress acting in capacity of a territorial (municipal) legislative body of the District of Columbia municipal corporation, also known as the United States (*supra*, n. 58), not the national legislative body of the United States of America, as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution and memorialized in that instrument.

Congressional fraud operates to deprive the American People of the unalienable Right of Liberty.

Fraud consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence it is always positive, intentional. . . . Constructive fraud consists in any act of commission or omission contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. . . .⁶⁴

Actual or positive *fraud* includes cases of the intentional and successful employment of any cunning, deception, or artifice, used to circumvent, cheat, or deceive another. . . . For instance, the misrepresentation by word or deed of material facts, by which one exercising reasonable discretion and confidence is misled to his injury, whether the misrepresentation was known to be false, or only

⁶⁴*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 1st ed., s.v. “Fraud.”

not known to be true, or even if made altogether innocently ; the suppression of material facts which one party is legally or equitably bound to disclose to another ; . . .⁶⁵

Congress' aforementioned modern reputation of "Most Despised Class in America" (*supra*, n. 37) is a product of, minimally, 149 years (beginning June 30, 1864) of the same type of deceitful, fraudulent "law" displayed in the examples in the four major legislative acts featured *supra* in this treatise, in contravention of the legislative intent of the Founding Fathers and Framers of the Constitution and spirit of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution and contrary to the equitable duty, trust, and confidence justly reposed in Congress as elected officials in a position of Public Trust, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of the American People. E.g., the misrepresentation and suppression of material facts as to the meaning of the novel terms of art "State" and "United States" operates to produce a constructive⁶⁶ waiver of the constitutional Right of Liberty, whereby the American People are misled to their injury:

Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with a sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.⁶⁷ [Supreme Court]

Systemic legislative fraud vs. principles of law.

- *Lex est ratio summa, quæ jubet quæ sunt utilia et necessaria, et contraria prohibet.* Law is the perfection of reason, which commands what is useful and necessary and forbids the contrary.
- *Lex est norma recti.* Law is a rule of right.
- *Quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.* Whatever is against the rule of right is a wrong.
- *Ubiunque est injuria, ibi damnum sequitur.* Wherever there is a wrong, there damage follows.
- *Ubi quid generaliter conceditur, inest hæc exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque.* Where a thing is granted in general terms, this exception is present, that there shall be nothing contrary to law and right.
- *Lex est dictamen rationis.* Law is the dictate of reason.
- *Ratio est radius divini luminis.* Reason is a ray of the divine light.⁶⁸
- *Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi limina.* Reason and authority are the two brightest lights in the world.
- *Ratio legis est anima legis.* The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
- *Ratio in jure æquitas integra.* Reason in law is perfect equity.
- *Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum.* Nothing against reason is lawful.
- *Non est certandum de regulis juris.* There is no disputing about rules of law.
- *Actor qui contra regulam quid adduxit, non est audiendus.* A pleader ought not to be heard who advances a proposition contrary to the rules of law.⁶⁹
- *Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.* In default of the law, the maxim rules.
- *Facta sunt potentiora verbis.* Facts are more powerful than words.
- *Ex facto jus oritur.* The law arises out of the fact; that is, its application must be to facts.⁷⁰

⁶⁵*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Fraud."

⁶⁶constructive, *adj.* . . . having an effect in law though not necessarily in fact. . . . *Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Constructive."

⁶⁷*Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742; 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970).

⁶⁸*Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Ratio est radius divini luminis."

⁶⁹*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 6th ed., s.v. "Maxim."

- *Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.* Intentions ought to be subservient to the laws, not the laws to intentions.
- *Sensus verborum est anima legis.* The meaning of words is the spirit of the law.
- *Verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat quam pereat.* Words are to be so understood that the subject-matter may be preserved rather than destroyed.
- *Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est; parum est enim ut non subverti possit.* Every definition in the civil is dangerous, for there is very little that cannot be overthrown. (There is no rule in the civil law which is not liable to some exception ; and the least difference in the facts of the case renders its application useless.)
- *Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde.* It is better that words should have no operation, than to operate absurdly.
- *Nil tamere novandum.* Nothing should be rashly changed.
- *Sicut natura nil facit per saltum, ita nec lex.* As nature does nothing by a bound or leap, so neither does the law.
- *Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.* It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.
- *Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.* Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.
- *Prætextu liciti non debet admitti illicitum.* Under pretext of legality, what is illegal ought not to be admitted.
- *Ea est accipienda interpretatio, quæ vitio caret.* That interpretation is to be received which is free from fault.
- *Dolus versatur in generalibus.* Fraud deals in generalities.
- *Dolosus versatur in generalibus.* A deceiver deals in generalities.
- *Fraus latet in generalibus.* Fraud lies hid in general expressions.
- *Fraus est celare fraudem.* It is a fraud to conceal a fraud.
- Once a fraud, always a fraud.
- *Dolus circuitu non purgatur.* Fraud is not purged by circuitry.⁷¹
- *Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.* A right of action cannot arise out of fraud.
- *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* False in one thing false in everything.
- *Error juris nocet.* Error of law is injurious.
- *Est autem vis legem simulans.* Violence may also put on the mask of law.⁷²
- *Quælibet jurisdictio cancellos suos habet.* Every jurisdiction has its bounds.
- *Rerum ordo confunditur, si unicuique jurisdictio non servatur.* The order of things is confounded if every one preserves not his jurisdiction.
- *Ubi non est condendi auctoritas, ibi non est parendi necessitas.* Where there is no authority to establish, there is no necessity to obey.
- *Maxims paci sunt contrari, vis et injuria.* The greatest enemies to peace are force and wrong.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹circuitry . . . roundabout circuitous procedure . . . lack of straightforwardness Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Circuitry."

⁷²Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Est autem vis legem simulans."

- *Nemo damnum facit, nisi qui id fecit quod facere jus non habet.* No one is considered as doing damage, unless he who is doing what he has no right to do.
- *Potentia non est nisi ad bonum.* Power is not conferred, but for the public good.
- *Potentia debet sequi justitiam, non antecedere.* Power ought to follow, not to precede, justice.
- *Jure naturæ æquum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorum.* According to the laws of nature, it is just that no one should be enriched with detriment and injury to another (i. e. at another's expense).
- *Legibus sumptis desinentibus, lege naturæ utendum est.* When laws imposed by the state fail, we must act by the law of nature.⁷³
- *Jura naturæ sunt immutabilia.* The laws of nature are unchangeable.
- *Salus populi est suprema lex.* The safety of the people is the supreme law.

“One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow.”⁷⁴

Whereas, many people believe that the word “state,” as found in the dictionary, just means one of the geographical areas of the Union, this word has three other senses or meanings: social, governmental, and political; *to wit, respectively:*

STATE, n. A . . . society of men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage, by the joint efforts of their combined strength. . . .

One of the component commonwealths or states of the United States of America.

The people of a state, in their collective capacity, considered as the party wronged by a criminal deed ; the public ; as in the title of a cause, “The State vs. A. B.”

The section of territory occupied by one of the United States.⁷⁵

The above is the reason statutes sometimes specify “in a territorial sense” or “when used in a geographical sense” when defining “United States.” As the second treatise available on this webpage (Link 2) demonstrates,⁷⁶ the Federal term “United States” when used in a:

- *Governmental sense* means the District of Columbia (government);
- *Political sense* means the District of Columbia (municipal corporation);
- *Commercial sense* means the District of Columbia (municipal corporation); and
- *Geographical (or territorial) sense* means the collective of the District of Columbia and certain of the territories (depending on the particular body of Federal law).⁷⁷

Official uses of the proper noun “United States” always mean either the District of Columbia (only) or the collective of the District of Columbia and certain of the territories.

The principal part, it is to be observed, of “United States” is “State.”

⁷³For “Law of nature,” see Thomas Clark Nelson, *How to use a car without the need for a driver's license*, <https://archive.org/details/PurgingAmericaOfTheMatrix>, Link 5, browser-page 23.

⁷⁴*Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur.* One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow.

⁷⁵*Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “State.”

⁷⁶Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, “Holy of Holies: Legal meaning of ‘United States’,” <https://archive.org/details/PurgingAmericaOfTheMatrix>, Link 2, browser-pages 39–42.

⁷⁷Notwithstanding that IRC defines “United States” in a geographical sense to mean the collective of the District of Columbia, Commonwealth Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, residents of the aforesaid five insular-U.S. possession States are not the subject of IRC, only residents (actual or legal) of the District of Columbia (n. 31, *supra*).

The seminal absurdity of the seeming infinity that now swirl about us—that effectively excludes all *Union-states* from the legal meaning of “United States” and turns the Declaration of Independence and Constitution on their head—is the Act of June 30, 1864, followed thereafter by the Act of March 9, 1878; *to wit*:

SEC. 182. *And be it further enacted*, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia . . .⁷⁸

SEC. 3140. The word “State,” when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia . . .⁷⁹

Application of our Corollary (*supra*, n. 50) to the geographical area affected by the Act of September 8, 1916, reveals that Congress act in capacity of legislative body of the District of Columbia municipal corporation and officially declare, by omission, that (1) the component commonwealths of the United States of America are not part of the United States, (2) the only States of the United States are the District of Columbia and the Territories, and (3) “State” and “United States” have the same definition and therefore mean the same thing; *to wit*:

SEC. 15. That the word “State” or “United States” when used in this title shall be construed to include any Territory, the District of Columbia, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands . . .

SEC. 200. That when used in this title— . . . The term “United States” means only the States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, and the District of Columbia; . . .⁸⁰

Whereas, § 15 tells us that all Territories are States, it is superfluous and misleading and operates as a circumlocution, pleonasm, and tautology in § 200 to state “The term ‘United States’ means only the States . . .” and then name the District of Columbia and Territories of Alaska and Hawaii—each of which is a State of the United States—and thereby infer, by implication, that such are not included in the phrase “only the States.”⁸¹

The nature of the “United States” in a geographical sense today is the same as 1916: the District of Columbia and certain of the territories/Territories.

“State” (Federal) vs. “state” (Federal).

Because every member of the legislative, judicial, and executive branch of every *Union-state* government holds a franchise (Social Security franchise) from the Government of the United States, he or she is, legally speaking, among numerous other things, a *United States Government employee* and resident for certain legal purposes such as taxation and licensing, of the District of Columbia and the subject of all legislation of the District of Columbia municipal corporation. Each of the governments of the so-called 50 States is staffed by *Federal personnel* and is an actual or constructive (*supra*, n. 66) *political subdivision* of the District of Columbia.⁸²

A more populous such political subdivision within the exterior limits of the same respective *Union-state* would be that composed of all the Social Security franchisees (not just the ones drawing a government paycheck) residing in that geographical area.

⁷⁸“An Act To provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes,” Ch. 173, Sec. 182, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864 (also cited *supra*, n. 21).

⁷⁹*Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873–’74*, Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, Ch. 1, Officers of Internal Revenue, p. 601, approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878.

⁸⁰“An Act To increase the revenue, and for other purposes,” Ch. 463, Sec. 200, 39 Stat. 756, September 8, 1916.

⁸¹As of September 8, 1916, the date of the above Act, the other “States” (Territories) of the United States are American Samoa, Guam, Midway Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.

⁸²*Ref.* ¶¶ 1–16 and nn. 52–61, in pp. 17–19 hereof.

As ordained in the Constitution, the only “laws” that can purport to assert power of personal legislative jurisdiction over any American are those enacted under authority of Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2)), which obtain only in places subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. As of July 4, 1776, till the advent of Social Security, no legislature has general power of personal legislative jurisdiction over any American residing within the exterior limits of any *Union-state*—except, as history tells us, those that can be bamboozled into believing that they reside in a “State” of the “United States” and therefore are the subject of legislation that mentions these “words” (terms).

For example, in the Old West the only towns with a requirement that folks surrender their guns into the custody of the sheriff while in town are situate in one of the predecessors of today’s *Union-states*—before admission to the Union—i.e., *a U.S. territory*. *Union-state* governments of that time observe the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution.

The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the servant of the lender.

Proverbs 22:7.

The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .

[T]he policies of the monarch are always those of his creditors.⁸³

Congressman John R. Rarick, 1971.

Early in the 20th century, District of Columbia municipal corporation policymakers (Congress) enact the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution, establishing, respectively, income tax and prohibition of alcoholic beverages in every “State” and the “United States” (*District of Columbia or one of the Territories or the collective thereof*) asserting power of personal legislative jurisdiction over all residents thereof. Notwithstanding that such are inapposite⁸⁴ as constitutional amendments per se (because the provisions thereof obtain only in *places subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States* and properly are nothing more than a rule or regulation under the territorial clause, Article 4 § 3(2)), and therefore fraudulent on their face: Such are the extremes to which the Board of Directors (Congress) of the District of Columbia municipal corporation will go to appease their creditors (principals of the private Federal Reserve; and before that, its parent bank, the private Bank of England).

Though generally the American People do not suffer from *ignorance of the fact*, most of them eventually throw in the towel and “volunteer” to comply with the new corporate policy; a relief to their “elected representatives in Congress”—who know that while *ignorance of the law* may not be “good for the USA,” it is cause for celebration in the “United States.”

The advent of Social Security (August 14, 1935) engenders more “cooperation” between those Americans “ignorant of the law” and enforcers of the word-game charade because all Social Security franchisees “voluntarily” agree to (1) establish legal residence in the District of Columbia, (2) obey the dictates of the Board of Directors of the District of Columbia municipal corporation (rules and regulations in the form of State and Federal statutes and amendments to the Constitution), and (3) assume the political duty of liability to income tax (Social Security Act § 801), the principal and ultimate purpose of the Social Security “retirement program.” Americans who aspire to positions high in “State” (District of Columbia political subdivision) government find out very quickly on which side their political bread is buttered.

⁸³Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” *Congressional Record* (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, 1260–1261.

⁸⁴*inapposite* . . . not apposite : not pertinent *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Inapposite.”

The “driving privilege”.

This treatise makes mention, on page 2 hereof, of what most believe is only a word, i.e., “driver.” The subject of “drivers,” “driver’s licenses,” and “motor vehicles” and the statutes that regulate them, even though it concerns essentially every American over the age of 15, nevertheless is confined to what appears to be “State” (political subdivision) legislation rather than that of our investigation up to this point, i.e., “national.”

Whereas, this arena is a key source of prima facie evidence⁸⁵ (“proof”) of residence, for certain legal purposes such as taxation and licensing, in the District of Columbia, it is proper that it have its own inquiry. There are other vital data, as well, about the career of the American Republic that one needs to know in order to liberate himself, as authorized by law, from the District of Columbia personal-jurisdiction scheme—and the other treatises and discourses in this webpage that address these matters await the reader’s scrutiny.

Notwithstanding the above, here are a few facts about the “driving privilege” for which the material available in this webpage provides indisputable documentary evidence:

- “The Driver License Compact (DLC) is an agreement among states that obligates member jurisdictions to exchange information about an individual’s driving history”⁸⁶;
- The sole authority with power to issue, suspend, or revoke a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle within the exterior limits of any *Union-state* is the District of Columbia, the one and only object of the meaning of the definition of the Driver License Compact terms “state” and “home state”;
- Any “*description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power*” whose identifying information is in a *motor vehicle record* is a *motor vehicle*;
- Motor vehicles are used exclusively “*for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo*”;
- The only type of driver’s license (“operator’s license” in some jurisdictions) issued by DMVs is an *occupational license* in the form of a *certificate*;
- Every driver’s or operator’s license issued by any DMV situate anywhere in the Union is a **District of Columbia occupational certificate**—i.e., *driving certificate* (like a *nursing certificate*)—for the privilege of pursuing one’s profession or calling in the operation of motor vehicles for commercial purposes on the highways as a *driver* in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo—the object of which is commonly known as the *driving privilege*;
- Every Social Security franchisee is a *person, natural person, individual*, member of the class defined as *Federal personnel*, and *legal resident of the District of Columbia*;
- Only *residents of the District of Columbia* are eligible for the driving privilege;
- Until one extinguishes by rescission the Social Security franchise he is a statutory **person**—and any and all of his outlays of funds relating to the operation of a motor vehicle (cost of vehicle, insurance, registration, fuel, repairs, upkeep, parking tickets, etc.) as a *driver*, are (minimally, Schedule C) business expenses for income-tax purposes. ■

⁸⁵PRIMA FACIE. Lat. At first sight ; on the first appearance ; on the face of it ; so far as can be judged from the first disclosure ; presumably. *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Prima facie.”

—Prima facie evidence. . . . Evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Ibid, s.v. “Evidence.”

⁸⁶Maryland Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Administration, “Driver’s License Compact . . . Ensuring a Consolidated Driver Record,” <http://www.mva.maryland.gov/About-MVA/INFO/26100/26100-22T.htm>.